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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
heritance tax regulations. It is well settled in West Virginia that
"statutes providing for taxation are to be construed strictly as against
the taxing power in favor of the taxpayer."39 Even though an estate
holding "eligible" bonds is permitted a tax advantage, the proper
way to remedy this is by legislation, not by administrative regula-
tion.40
John Michael Anderson
PRICE FIXING-FAIR TRADE LAWS
The fair-trade movement began when California enacted the
first fair-trade statute in 1931.1 Initially there was some concern
about the constitutionality of fair-trade laws, but this doubt was
removed by a 1936 Supreme Court ruling which held that the Illi-
nois fair-trade act was valid and not in violation of the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution.2
The following year the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the
Sherman Act was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill for the
District of Columbia, after attempts at enacting it as a separate
statute failed.3 The Miller-Tydings Act provides that contracts or
agreements prescribing minimum resale prices of trademarked or
brand named products are exempt from the operation of the
Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.4 Since with-
"Neal v. City of Huntington, 168 S.E. 2d 223, 226 (W.Va. 1967).
'Memorandum opinion of the Honorable James G. McClure in the case
of In re Bowers, No. 4146-M (Ohio County Cir. Ct., W.Va. 1968).
'See CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE §§ 16900-16905 (Deering
1960). The nonsigner provision of the California statute was added by amend-
ment in 1933.
2Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 US. 183 (1936).
3For a good account of the legislative history, see Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss
Co., 56 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. La. 1944).
'Provided, That nothing contained in sections 1-7 (The Sherman Act)
of this title shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing
minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the
label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of
the producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free
and open competition with commodities of the same general class
produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of
that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under
any statute, law or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale
is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for
such resale, and the making of such contracts or agreements shall not
be an unfair method of competition under section 46 (The Federal
Trade Commission Act) of this title: Provided further, That the pre-
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out such exemption contracts or agreements prescribing minimum
resale prices of goods traveling in interstate commerce would violate
the Sherman Act and the making of such contracts or agreements
would violate the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Miller-
Tydings Act opened interstate commerce to fair trade where pre-
viously it had been limited to goods moving intrastate.5
Following passage of the Miller-Tydings Act, almost every
state proceeded to enact fair-trade legislation. However, price con-
trol was not to come so easily, and in 1950 the Supreme Court dealt
fair-trade a setback when it held that the Miller-Tydings Act only
exempted enforcement of minimum resale price agreements against
contracting parties and did not permit such enforcement against
nonsigners.8 The Court held that imposition of price fixing on
nonsigners was a resort to coercion not intended by the Miller-
Tydings Act.7
Congress, however, rendered the Court's ruling inoperative by
enacting the McGuire Amendment to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.8 The amendment reinstated enforcement of minimum or
stipulated prices on trade-marked goods against nonsigners of price
maintenance contracts who have notice of the existence of such
contracts. This was achieved by exempting from the Federal Trade
Commission Act the enforcement of any right or right of action
created by state law against nonsigners who advertise, sell, or offer
for sale at below the prescribed minimum resale prices.9
ceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agreement, pro-
viding for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices
on any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between
producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between
ctors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations
in competition with each other.
MILLER-TYDINGS Acr, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
'In the absence of such an exemption, resale price maintenance agreements,
or concerted efforts to enforce such agreements violate the antitrust laws.
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
'Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1950).
"'When they seek, however, to impose price fixing on persons who have
not contracted or agreed to the scheme, the situation is vastly different. That
is not price fixing by contract or agreement; that is price fixing by compulsion."
Id. at 388.
'McGumE Acr, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
'Id. (3) Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust
Acts shall render unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right
or right of action created by any statute, law or public policy now
or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Colum-
bia, which in substance provides that willfully and knowingly adver-
tising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the
price or prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements whether the
19701
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The McGuire Amendment was attacked in Louisiana a year
after passage, but this time fair trade won, and a federal circuit
court in a two to one decision upheld both the McGuire Amend-
ment and the Louisiana fair-trade law as valid under the due pro-
cess clause of the Federal Constitution.0 The court also agreed that
it was clearly the intent of Congress to allow application of fair trade
restrictions to nonsigners."1 The dissent argued that the fair-trade
law of Louisiana was an unlawful delegation of price-fixing, a legis-
lative function, to individual vendors and vendees.2
Recently fair-trade laws, particularly their nonsigner clauses,
have come under attack from another direction. Although forty-six
states at one time or another enacted fair-trade laws, four states have
repealed their fair-trade laws, and the courts of four other states
have held their fair-trade laws to be in violation of their state con-
stitutions.13 Furthermore, courts in seventeen states have struck
down the nonsigner provisions of their states' fair-trade laws as
violating their state constitutions. 4 Generally, states which have
overturned the nonsigner clause in their fair-trade laws have done
so on the basis that it exceeds the police power of the state," that
person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party
to such a contract or agreement, is unfair competition and is actionable
at the suit of any perion damaged thereby.
(4) Neither the making of contracts or agreements as described in
paragraph (2) of this subsection, nor the exercise or enforcement of
any right or right of action as described in paragraph (3) of this
subsection shall constitute an unlawful burden or restraint upon, or
interference with, commerce.
ISchwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lilli Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied 346 U.S. 856 (1953).
"Id. at 793. "The intention of Congress and the intention of the Louisiana
Legislature are clearly that restrictions on the non-signers, when imposed as
the result of a contract between a producer and a distributor, are to be given
effect."
Id. at 798. [T]o the extent that it is coercive, it is lacking in due pro-
cess, confiscatory, and void. Being entirely coercive as to the appel-
lants, the judgment appealed from, should be reversed; otherwise the
original Sherman Act may be whittled away by legislative exemptions
and exceptions, administrative orders and processes, trade-mark de-
vices, patent rights, judicial decisions and consensual price-fixing under
brigaded state and federal legislation.
Nebraska, Hawaii, Kansas, and Nevada have repealed their fair-trade
acts. Courts in Alabama, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming have found their fair-
trade laws to violate their respective state constitutions; and Alaska, Missouri,
Texas, and Vermont have never enacted fair-trade laws. For a full breakdown
on fair-trade laws in each state, see "Trade Reg. Rep., . 6000 (1967).
'Trade Reg. Rep., l. 6021, at 9038 (1967).
'Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 224
Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 454 (1955); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis,
134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956) ; Argus Cameras, Inc. v. Hall of Distributors,
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it denies due process,16 that it is unlawful delegation of legislative
authority,1 or because of technical defects generally having to do
with state constitutional provisions regarding titles of legislative
enactments.'1
8
Thus there are twelve states without fair-trade laws and seven-
teen states in which nonsigners cannot be compelled to follow fair-
trade price guides. Since price wars and price cutting in general
are usually carried on by the very retailers who refuse to sign the
fair-trade contract, the nonsigner clause is the backbone of fair-
trade laws and without it fair-trade laws are meaningless. Therefore,
in twenty-nine states fair trade either does not exist or is unenforce-
able.
The justification of fair-trade laws and their enforcement against
nonsigners is generally stated to be that of permitting trade-mark
owners to protect the good will of their trade-mark or brand name,
the feeling being that this good will is the property of the trade-mark
owner. The use of the well-known branded or trade-marked product
Inc., 343 Mich. 54, 72 N.W.2d 152 (1955); McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis &
Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955); Shaggs Drug Center v.
General Electric Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957); Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958);
General Electric Co. v. Whale, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956); Rogers-
Kent, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 231 S.C. 636, 44 S.E.2d 669 (1957); General
Electric Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co., 143 W. Va. 491, 103 S.E.2d 310 (1958).
"BUnion Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 224
Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 454 (1955); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis,
134 Colo. 160, 501 P.2d 139 (1956); Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1944); Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85
S.E.2d 514 (1955); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods
Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952); McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis
& Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955); Skaggs Drug Center
v. General Electric Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957); Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958);
and Rogers Kent, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 231 S.C. 636, 49 S.E.2d 665
(1957).
"Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 134
(1956); Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951);
Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane, 237 Ind. 188, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957); Dr. G.
H. Teckner Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 231 La.
51, 90 So.2d 343 (1956); McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug. Co.,
159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958); General Electric
Co. v. Whale, 207 Ore. 302, 246 P.2d 635 (1956).
"General Electric Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co.. 143 W. Va. 491, 493, 103
S.E.2d 310, 311 (1958) in which the nonsigner clause was held invalid in part
because it "embraces a matter not stated in the title of said Act, nor germane
to the matter stated in the title, and is therefore, unconstitutional and void,
because violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution of West Vir-
ginia .... " Accord, Bristol, Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla.
508, 188 So.2d 91 (1959).
1970]
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss1/10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
as a loss leader 9 is often cited as one of the practices sought to be
curtailed by fair trade. Also it is asserted that fair trade helps to
stabilize the economy, preserves small businesses from destructive
price competition, and protects consumers against the deceptive use
of loss leaders and the long run monopolization of distributive out-
lets.m
However, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission opposed the enactment of the Miller-Tydings and
McGuire exemptions,21 and the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws recommended the repeal
of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts."* Their reasons for opposi-
tion to fair trade are that: it goes further than is necessary to control
loss leader selling and protect good will by eliminating all price
reduction on such commodities; it relieves distributors from the
rigors of price competition and thereby reduces incentive for ef-
ficiency in distribution; it is unnecessary to prevent monopolization
of distributive outlets; and it facilitates horizontal price fixing and
deprives consumers of the benefits of price competition in the
distribution of goods.
23
It is argued by those in favor of fair trade that since a product
cannot be fair traded under the McGuire Act unless it is in free and
open competition with commodities of the same general class, fair
trade does not in effect act to reduce competition. 24 However, those
opposed to fair trade argue that since a single price fixing commo-
dity would be exposed to competition from comparable articles
sold at a lesser price, horizontal collusion in violation of the law
is an indispensable part of fair-trade price maintenance. There-
fore, the "free and open competition" requirement is ineffective
"Loss leader is the term applied to the practice of selling nationally
known articles at cost or less than cost for the calculated purpose of enticing
customers away from competitors and into stores where they may be entrapped
into purchasing other goods at marked up prices that will more than make
up for the loss on the leader.
"'See L. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS, 125 (1934); WEIGEL, THE FAIR
TRADE ACtS (1938); Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64
YALE L.J. 967 (1955).
'For samples of the views of the Federal Trade Commihsion and Depart-
ment of Justice toward Fair Trade, see F.T.C., REPORT ON RESALE PRIcE MAIN-
TENANCE (1945); 1955 ATr'v GEN. REP. 153-55.
21955 ATr'Y GEN. REP. 153-55.
=Id.
"Hearings on H.R. 5767 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. at 17 (1952).
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and fair-trade laws act as a cover for horizontal price fixing.' Since
fair-traded products (being brand named or trade-marked items)
are usually sold in markets of few sellers, if fair trade is a factor
tending to limit competition it does so in a market in which com-
petition is already reduced.
Even assuming effective competition among manufacturers,
there is no rational foundation for the assertion that a sufficient
degree of competition among manufacturers eliminates the possi-
bility that significant adverse effects may result from fair trade. In-
so far as fair trade is effective it tends to raise distribution costs
by depriving low cost distributors and their customers of the ad-
vantages of their efficiency, and diverting competition into cost in-
creasing non-price channels such as games, trading stamps, and
various advertising gimmicks.2 6
Indeed, distributors hostile to fair trade charge that fair-
trade prices carry unreasonably high profit margins ranging from 33
to 50% and that satisfactory profits can be obtained by much lower
profit margins which would permit increasing the volume of sales.:
This high profit margin, which allegedly decreases sales volume
but not sales profits (which because of higher prices are completely
out of proportion to production and sales, hence inflationary), de-
prives the consumer of any chance at savings through the exercise
of thrift. Since these high prices are uniform, the consumer is in
fact paying not only for the product, but also the above mentioned
n[I]n practice it is nearly always impossible for one manufacturer to
establish a system of vertical price fixing unless he can be sure that his
competitors will do likewise; and a single price-fixing commodity is
exposed to the inroads of competing commodities when these articles
cal be sold for less than the fixed price. Consequently, horizontal col-
lusion in violation of the law has been an indispensable part of the
movement for resale price maintenance . . . . If the Antitrust Division
had the men and money to examine every resale price contract which
has been written under the cloak of State and Federal legislation . . .
there would be practically no resale price contracts. In the absence of
such wholesale law enforcement, the system of resale price legislation
has become a breeding ground for restraints of trade such as Congress
never intended to sanction and did not sanction. Hearings on Resale
Price Maintenance Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 12 at 440 (1952).
-'When retailers are prevented by law from competing on the basis of
price, they are forced to resort to extra services or gimmicks, games, and trad-
ing stamps. Since fair trade prohibits the offering or giving of these items
in connection with a fair-trade product, their cost must be added to the mini-
mum resale price requirement. See, e.g., W. VA. CoDe ch. 47, art. 11, § 3
(Michie 1966).
"Hearings on Resale Price Maintenance Before the Antitrust Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Ses. at 602 (1952).
1970]
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games, trading stamps, advertising gimmicks, air conditioned store-
rooms, sales services such as delivery or credit, and various other
extras which the consumer may not desire.
It is claimed that fair trade protects the local independent mer-
chant who cannot compete with the large chain stores, who buy in
large volume and have a faster rate of turnover. This is not necessar-
ily so, since in recent years it has become commonplace for the chain
stores to develop their own "private label" products. These "pri-
vate label" products sell for less than trademarked or brand named
products, and since these "private label" products are often identi-
cal to the trademarked products, except for the name on the carton,
it is difficult to see how fair trade will enable the local merchant to
keep the price-conscious consumer.
In 1937, the West Virginia Legislature enacted a fair-trade
law2 8 which included the typical nonsigner clause.2° Some twenty
years later General Electric Company sought to enjoin Dandy
Appliance Company, a nonsigner, from selling trademarked articles
below minimum retail prices fixed by the former under agreements
with dealers. The circuit court held that the act was void and certi-
fied questions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.30
The court admitted that under the great weight of authority
the act was valid under the Federal Constitution, but noted that
such authority is not conclusive in determining whether such an act
is within the police power of this state or is violative of the due pro-
cess provisions of the West Virginia constitution. 81 The court con-
cluded that the act (as applied to nonsigners) 32 was not a proper
'W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 11 (Michie 1966).
'Id. § 6. Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or
selling any commodity at less that the price stipulated in any contract
entered into pursuant to the provisions of this article, whether the
person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party
to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of
any person damaged thereby.
3"General Electric Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co., 143 IV. Va. 491, 103 S.E.2d
310 (1958).
'Id. at 495, 103 S.E.2d at 314.
'-Throughout the Dandy opinion, the court used the word "Act", resulting
in confusion as to whether the decision was that the entire Fair Trade Act
was void, or that only § 6, the non-signer provision, was void. A subsequent
decision, Union Underwear Co. v. Aide, 151 W. Va. 918, 159 S.E.2d 217 (1967),
interpreted the Dandy decision as holding only § 6 of the Fair Trade Act
void, meaning that resale price maintenance contracts voluntarily entered
may still he enforced. See W. VA. CoDE ch. 47, art. 11, § 2 (Michie 1966).
A vigorous dissent in Union criticized the majority and stated that the Dandy
decision did declare the entire Fair Trade Act to be void.
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